The zombie example is not utilitarianism and is based on an invalid and hidden premise (that preserving the human race is the ultimate good). Timothy Brahm even implicitly rejects this premise when he implies that his values place the prevention of rape above preserving the human race. The race example is extremely likely to offend and permanently derail the potential for productive dialogue. Perhaps that example could use a little more refinement?
Fair points, there. I agree that the zombie argument probably doesn't work without a substantial modification. That said, the following blog post (well worth a read), http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2018/03/oxford-uehiro-prize-in-practical-ethics-when-is-sex-with-conjoined-twins-permissible/ indirectly raises a really tough (and topical with #metoo) challenge to utilitarianism. If I may quote from it with some additions just for clarification: " A and B are homogenitally conjoined twins [cojoined twins that share one pair of genitals]. B is in a permanent vegetative state and so is severely mentally incapacitated [and therefore incapable of consenting to sex]. A validly consents to [genital] sex with C. A and C have [genital] sex." It seems to me that under a utilitarian ethic, it follows that if C validly consents to (genital) sex with A and both A and C desire it, that it would be hard not to conclude that it might not only be morally justified for C to have (genital) sex with person B without their consent (i.e rape), but that it may even be morally good. This is a bullet that I would unsuprisingly be unwilling to bite. The blog post throws up a stack of challenges that are likely to test more or less any worldview as well, I hasten to add, but I find it very hard not to conclude that a utilitarian ethic is therefore incorrect. I also note that Peter Singer also articulated a similar view himself according to the New York Times about a year ago, although he said that it would be potentially justified to have sex with someone in a coma without ever having got consent from them. In regards the second analogy, I would fully concur with you there elpolloloco that it is likely to be a very counter-productive argument. I suspect in truth though, that some readers of this comment may be unsure as to why. Speaking as a pro-lifer that's also a strong progressive (and can therefore offer insights into what progressives will end up hearing at first), it's likely that such an analogy is going to be misunderstood as minimising and condoning racism (at best), or suggesting that racial genocide is a legitimate topic of debate (definitely not the best way to start a dialogue, unless you're trying to get someone out of the KKK or another hate group); and the above I think applies even moreso if the person you are talking to has faced/faces racial discrimination. I strongly suspect that such arguments are also very likely (even among close friends or those not easily offended) to make people act defensively to retreat from dialogue as well, doubly so if in the US where non-adversarial political discourse is sadly dying out. I do find that argument very much out of line with the other, usually excellent dialogue suggestions ERI usually offers, so do agree that Timothy needs to go back to the drawing board here.
"Question: What is an effective story that you have used to help a utilitarian to 'bite the bullet'?" Here's one that I haven't used yet. If anyone gets a chance to try it before I do, let me know: David Benatar thinks that life isn't worth living, and his arguments have stood up pretty well so far in debates. Utilitarianism aims to maximize the sum total of human happiness and minimize the sum total of human unhappiness. According to Benatar, in balance the weight is unavoidably on the side of unhappiness. If that turns out to be true, then the extinction of the human race would eliminate that whole balance of human unhappiness. Let's assume that pushing a button would end the human race and that it's not possible to be selective about it. Would you push the button?
Utilitarianism is not based on abstract mathematical concepts like negative numbers. There's nothing utilitarian about eliminating all human happiness because 0 is mathematically greater than -1.
The race example is extremely likely to offend and permanently derail the potential for productive dialogue. Perhaps that example could use a little more refinement?
" A and B are homogenitally conjoined twins [cojoined twins that share one pair of genitals]. B is in a permanent
vegetative state and so is severely mentally incapacitated [and therefore incapable of consenting to sex]. A
validly consents to [genital] sex with C. A and C have [genital] sex."
It seems to me that under a utilitarian ethic, it follows that if C validly consents to (genital) sex with A and both A and C desire it, that it would be hard not to conclude that it might not only be morally justified for C to have (genital) sex with person B without their consent (i.e rape), but that it may even be morally good. This is a bullet that I would unsuprisingly be unwilling to bite. The blog post throws up a stack of challenges that are likely to test more or less any worldview as well, I hasten to add, but I find it very hard not to conclude that a utilitarian ethic is therefore incorrect.
I also note that Peter Singer also articulated a similar view himself according to the New York Times about a year ago, although he said that it would be potentially justified to have sex with someone in a coma without ever having got consent from them.
In regards the second analogy, I would fully concur with you there elpolloloco that it is likely to be a very counter-productive argument. I suspect in truth though, that some readers of this comment may be unsure as to why. Speaking as a pro-lifer that's also a strong progressive (and can therefore offer insights into what progressives will end up hearing at first), it's likely that such an analogy is going to be misunderstood as minimising and condoning racism (at best), or suggesting that racial genocide is a legitimate topic of debate (definitely not the best way to start a dialogue, unless you're trying to get someone out of the KKK or another hate group); and the above I think applies even moreso if the person you are talking to has faced/faces racial discrimination. I strongly suspect that such arguments are also very likely (even among close friends or those not easily offended) to make people act defensively to retreat from dialogue as well, doubly so if in the US where non-adversarial political discourse is sadly dying out.
I do find that argument very much out of line with the other, usually excellent dialogue suggestions ERI usually offers, so do agree that Timothy needs to go back to the drawing board here.
Here's one that I haven't used yet. If anyone gets a chance to try it before I do, let me know:
David Benatar thinks that life isn't worth living, and his arguments have stood up pretty well so far in debates. Utilitarianism aims to maximize the sum total of human happiness and minimize the sum total of human unhappiness. According to Benatar, in balance the weight is unavoidably on the side of unhappiness. If that turns out to be true, then the extinction of the human race would eliminate that whole balance of human unhappiness. Let's assume that pushing a button would end the human race and that it's not possible to be selective about it. Would you push the button?