I think that the "If you're REALLY pro-life you'd support/oppose X!" is a way if deflecting the person's own moral discomfort with abortion. They have this nagging feeling that the prolifers are right, that abortion really is killing tiny, helpless, innocent human beings.... But they don't want to have to think about it so it's easier to pick a cause that they feel really good about and assert that prolifers can't be right about abortion because they're so wrong about X.
Well Tim, since you asked, you are both wrong and inconsistent if you fail to denounce forced separations. You've justified your opposition to abortion by stating that it is wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings. In order to be consistent you must also hold that it is wrong to intentionally harm innocent human beings. Although kill and harm are not the same, when viewed within the context of the moral framework you articulate, the two words are largely indistinguishable. Moreover, should you seek to argue semantics, then you undermine the perception of your moral standing and legitimacy. For obvious reasons, if you state an absolute moral principle and then try to beg out and argue semantics for why you shouldn't be held to the standard you've articulated, at minimum it looks flaky (even if your argument is valid). Further, you do great harm to the pro life movement and its outreach by articulating and validating a position of indifference (it's not my problem) and offering permission to "look the other way." This encourages tribalism, division, and alienation when the goal of any movement seeking to gain traction is to be as inclusive as possible to as wide a demographic as possible. If the principles behind the pro life movement are meant to exist above the partisan divide then they must be applicable in other scenarios not simply abortion. When you reject and dismiss such applications in a partisan way or complain about being held to 'weird standards' you undermine the legitimacy of the "principle" you claim to follow. When people accuse you of being inconsistent its because they are holding you to their understanding of your principle. That's a good thing because they've already assumed your moral principle is valid! Perhaps their understanding is incorrect or wrong, but if you shut them down without addressing this, you sow the seeds of distrust and hypocrisy. As you state, if the public perception is that your moral compass is broken, they aren't likely to take your moral pronouncements seriously. Lastly, from what I've seen, you do not devalue other people's tragedies in order to elevate pro life issues, nor do you appropriate issues of other groups to legitimize pro life arguments (so kudos to you). Unfortunately this is not the case for the larger movement. Since the comments you mentioned did not appear to be directly accusing ERI of inconsistency, your defense against inconsistency is not valid within this wider context.
The inconsistency I find most interesting is the use of: Proverbs 24:10-12 (NLTSE) [10] If you fail under pressure, your strength is too small. [11] Rescue those who are unjustly sentenced to die; save them as they stagger to their death. [12] Don't excuse yourself by saying, "Look, we didn't know." For God understands all hearts, and he sees you. He who guards your soul knows you knew. He will repay all people as their actions deserve. I have heard Christians say that this justifies defense. It certainly compells us to defend anyone facing death. Especially in the light of James 4:17 (NLTSE) [17] Remember, it is sin to know what you ought to do and then not do it. I have problems understanding how it is OK to use violence to carry out that defense in some situations but not in others. I don’t believe in any violence against humans. I believe that’s for God to sort out. But I think it is inconsistent to say that it is ok to use violence to save a born person from injury or death but not to save an unborn person from death. If it is about numbers of deaths, an abortionist kills thousands of people. After all, 50 to 80 million people were killed over the 6 years in WW2. In 2016, the total deaths in the world from all causes eg war, famine, disease, cancer, old age etc was 56.9Million: http://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/the-top-10-causes-of-death The number of people executed in the prenatal stages of life per year is nearly the same- 56 Million (2010–2014), (https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-worldwide). Perhaps there is something I’m missing here. (I do admit it may be inconsistent to be a pacifist and also go to doctors)
I agree that it's unfair to hold pro-lifers to this ridiculous standard. However I personally do try to meet that standard because I want to support policies that result in less death. However maybe I'm inconsistent because I don't even vote but it's more because I don't think politics is the answer to problems. However certain issues such as veganism and LGBT rights are important to me because I do find it inconsistent when people kill other animals but then talk about being pro-life. I also think that anybody who is anti-abortion must also be allies to the gay people because honestly there would be fewer abortions if they weren't pressured into pretending they are straight and then getting into relationships that they don't want and that could result in unwanted pregnancy.
I am interested in your comments. I knew a girl who had a shotgun wedding and then another child. Her husband then left her to “live with “ a man. I guess a woman who is pregnant in that situation may be tempted in this day and age to want the “pregnancy” to go away because she feels unsupported. Considering that the number of same gender “couples” is less than 2% of all couples (according to several censuses), the numbers of babies killed for this reason would, I expect, be low although I do agree that 1 death is too many.
It's also hard to know how many same sex couples there are considering most are probably very secretive about being gay and only some have the guts to demand gay marriage be legal and yet it's becoming more popular in general.
A very clearly-reasoned post, thanks. But I think it's not surprising that many intelligent pro-choicers might think they find inconsistency in a pro-life position that does not also promote various liberal positions such as those you mention – even if you tell them that you base your pro-life position on "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" or "it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings." I think the problem revolves around this: I’m justifying my pro-life stance. . . . with the principle that it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings. Perhaps I should be using a different principle. I think that a different principle would in fact seem less inconsistent to many people, because "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" and "it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings" may seem to many people like narrow principles you could not genuinely hold without basing them on some more foundational principle. To a utilitarian, for instance, you would have to base "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" on the idea that we ought not kill a small, defenseless person BECAUSE it would deprive that small, defenseless person of happiness. And then the utilitarian would argue that if the small, defenseless person was likely to grow up poor, killing it would NOT deprive it of happiness – rather it would only deprive it of unhappiness – and would argue moreover that anyone concerned about happiness would have to be concerned about the happiness or unhappiness of immigrant children, for instance. Maybe there is also a different set of pro-choicers, who would in fact agree that you are not being inconsistent if your principle is "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people," but how often do they hear pro-lifers clearly articulating that narrow principle? Pro-choicers see pro-lifers holding up pictures of cute babies and saying "life!" (if not simply invoking God), and naturally those pro-choicers think of cute immigrant kids whose quality-of-life, if not life itself, is at risk just as that of the unborn is. Many pro-choicers may not actually hear pro-lifers clearly articulating ANY narrow moral principle, so naturally they make assumptions about what pro-lifers' main moral principle must be – generalized compassion, for instance – and they observe that many pro-lifers don't seem to be applying that (assumed) principle consistently. And a couple of factors make it still harder for pro-choicers to see a consistent application of that assumed principle of generalized compassion:
right-wing economics is very counter-intuitive compared to left-wing (in terms of helping the disadvantaged)
the right therefore has to try harder than the left to SELL the idea that they are compassionate, and they do an abysmal job of selling it. Regarding 2: Let's suppose the right actually cares as much as the left about immigrant children separated from their parents, or cares even more, but thinks that the solution, rather than releasing both parents and children into the US, is better supply-side economics in Guatemala. If they think that that is the solution, why didn't they get some heart-rending images of immigrant children and organize a supply-side-economics demonstration in front of the Guatemalan Embassy even BEFORE the left organized any demonstrations? Why did they let it appear that, had the left not taken the initiative regarding those separated kids, they (the right) would have remained perfectly happy with the status quo and oblivious to all the suffering? And then another thing is: luxury. If supply-side or other right-wing economics is correct, that still wouldn't explain Mitt Romney saying, "Ann drives a couple of Cadillacs." That still wouldn't explain luxury spending and other seemingly unnecessary kinds of spending by conservatives – all the seemingly bloated military spending, for instance. To summarize: I agree that pro-lifers are not actually inconsistent, but I think it may be more understandable than you may have indicated why pro-choicers might perceive them that way. By the way, getting back to this – The question of how much we help other people, or rather, the question of how much we force people to help other people, is different in kind from the question of whether we allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people – and what you have called elsewhere "the intentional killing vs withholding treatment distinction," coincidentally I just read yesterday something that might be worth thinking about. Paul Bloom, in Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, says: We think it is worse to intentionally kill someone than to knowingly allow the person to die (even when rescuing them would be relatively easy), because no society can survive if individuals could kill one another at will, but it's less critical that we be obliged to save one another. In other words, a moral intuition developed in us evolutionarily that we should not kill, but there was no such evolutionary compulsion to develop an intuition to rescue – which would mean that the differing intuitions might mislead us into thinking that there is a moral distinction which a deeper philosophy or deeper meditation would not support.
I think it is interesting that a “pro abortion choice” person thinks that it is inconsistent for a Pro Life person not to have the same attitudes as them in every other area than the right to life of innocent human babies. Doesn’t that suggest that they are inconsistent if they think that “pro life” is consistent with all their other views. The second part about “evolutionary compulsion” seems to fit with what Fr Robert J Spitzer calls the “silver rule”: don’t do to anyone else what you don’t want them to do to you. Some people think this is the golden rule but that is: Luke 6:31 (NLTSE) [31] Do to others as you would like them to do to you. which is quite different.
Thanks for your reply. Let me see if I understand your reasoning in your first paragraph. Does it go like this? –
According to pro-choicers, "pro-life" should mean advocating a) the right to life of unborn babies + b) universal health care + c) universal basic income + d) open borders, etc.
The fact that advocating a) is (by pro-choicers' own account) an indispensable part of being pro-life is shown by the fact that advocating a) while opposing b), c), d), etc., is being "inconsistently pro-life." To be inconsistently pro-life, one would have to advocate at least one position that is pro-life; by process of elimination (since the "inconsistently pro-life" person opposes b, c, d, etc.), advocating a) must be a pro-life position.
Pro-choicers advocate b), c), d), etc., but oppose a), therefore they are (even by their own account) inconsistently pro-life.
I agree with 3. I am trying to get my head around what you are saying with 2. I like your concept of using a) b) c) and d) So if a) is pro abortion choice And someone who is in favour of a) and b) and c) and d) says that to oppose a) you must agree with b) c) and d) is being inconsistent because if that were the case either: they would need to oppose a) or they would need to say that being in favour of b) c) and d) requires agreement with a) to be consistent. As you point out, this things have no connection and so the accusations are null and void.
Thanks. I believe that the 4th paragraph of your reply to me correctly schematizes your original first paragraph, and does so in a simpler way than I tried to schematize it, even if my way was also correct. That 4th paragraph is: "And someone who is in favour of a) and b) and c) and d) [and] says that to oppose a) you must agree with b) c) and d) is being inconsistent because if that were the case either: they would need to oppose a) or they would need to say that being in favour of b) c) and d) requires agreement with a) to be consistent." So you argue that a pro-choicer who alleges inconsistency on our side claims (A) – that to oppose a) you must agree with [/support] b) c) and d) – which if true would falsify/negate a claim (B) – to support b) c) and d) you must agree with [/support] a)* – and yet those pro-choicers DO support a) b) c) and d), a position which you think must be based on claim B. So you think they are making claim B, which would be inconsistent in light of their claim A. I agree that A falsifies B. But are those pro-choicers really necessarily making claim B? They could support a) b) c) and d) based on another claim (C) – to support b) c) and d) you need not, but CAN, support a). In other words, those pro-choicers may be arguing – to oppose a) you must support b) c) and d), but you can support b) c) and d) and also support a). How would that work? Well, couldn't they consistently argue (I won't necessarily say correctly argue, but consistently argue), for instance – to oppose a) you must believe that the unborn are persons, and if you defend the unborn on grounds of compassion as we think you do, you must defend liberal policy interpretations of compassion toward other groups of persons – if you don't you are inconsistent by your own premises – whereas we can support a) and also support liberal policy interpretations of compassion toward other groups, because we don't think the unborn are persons – we have different premises from you, and you are inconsistent by your own premises, while we are not inconsistent by our own premises. (See also what Timothy Brahm says above about the two libertarians.)
Which you phrased as "being in favour of b) c) and d) requires agreement with a)," but I have tried to say the same thing while keeping the terminology as parallel as possible.
A very clearly-reasoned post, thanks. But I think it's not surprising that many intelligent pro-choicers might think they find inconsistency in a pro-life position that does not also promote various liberal positions such as those you mention – even if you tell them that you base your pro-life position on "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" or "it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings." I think the problem revolves around this: I’m justifying my pro-life stance. . . . with the principle that it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings. Perhaps I should be using a different principle. I think that a different principle would in fact seem less inconsistent to many people, because "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" and "it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings" may seem to many people like narrow principles you could not genuinely hold without basing them on some more foundational principle. To a utilitarian, for instance, you would have to base "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" on the idea that we ought not kill a small, defenseless person BECAUSE it would deprive that small, defenseless person of happiness. And then the utilitarian would argue that if the small, defenseless person was likely to grow up poor, killing it would NOT deprive it of happiness – rather it would only deprive it of unhappiness – and would argue moreover that anyone concerned about happiness would have to be concerned about the happiness or unhappiness of immigrant children, for instance. Maybe there are also a different set of pro-choicers, who would in fact agree that you are not being inconsistent if your principle is "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people," but how often do they hear pro-lifers clearly articulating that narrow principle? Pro-choicers see pro-lifers holding up pictures of cute babies and saying "life!" (if not simply invoking God), and naturally those pro-choicers think of cute immigrant kids whose quality-of-life, if not life itself, is at risk just as that of the unborn is. Many pro-choicers may not actually hear pro-lifers clearly articulating ANY narrow moral principle, so naturally they make assumptions about what pro-lifers' main moral principle must be -- generalized compassion, for instance -- and they observe that many pro-lifers don't seem to be applying that (assumed) principle consistently. And a couple of factors make it still harder for pro-choicers to see a consistent application of that assumed principle of generalized compassion:
right-wing economics is very counter-intuitive compared to left-wing
the right therefore has to try harder than the left to SELL the idea that they are compassionate, and they do an abysmal job of selling it. Regarding 2: Let's suppose the right actually cares as much as the left about immigrant children separated from their parents, or cares even more, but thinks that the solution, rather than releasing both parents and children into the US, is better supply-side economics in Guatemala. If they think that that is the solution, why didn't they organize a supply-side-economics demonstration in front of the Guatemalan Embassy even BEFORE the left organized any demonstrations? Why did they let it appear that, had the left not taken the initiative regarding those separated kids, they (the right) would have remained perfectly happy with the status quo and oblivious to all the suffering? And then another thing is: luxury. If supply-side or other right-wing economics is correct, that still wouldn't explain Mitt Romney saying, "Ann drives a couple of Cadillacs." That still wouldn't explain luxury spending and other seemingly unnecessary kinds of spending by conservatives – all the seemingly bloated military spending, for instance. By the way, getting back to this – The question of how much we help other people, or rather, the question of how much we force people to help other people, is different in kind from the question of whether we allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people – and what you have called elsewhere "the intentional killing vs withholding treatment distinction," coincidentally I just read yesterday something that might be worth thinking about. Paul Bloom, in Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, says: We think it is worse to intentionally kill someone than to knowingly allow the person to die (even when rescuing them would be relatively easy), because no society can survive if individuals could kill one another at will, but it's less critical that we be obliged to save one another. In other words, a moral intuition developed in us evolutionarily that we should not kill, but there was no such evolutionary compulsion to develop an intuition to rescue – which would mean that the differing intuitions might mislead us into thinking that there is a moral distinction which a deeper philosophy or deeper meditation would not support.
You've justified your opposition to abortion by stating that it is wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings. In order to be consistent you must also hold that it is wrong to intentionally harm innocent human beings. Although kill and harm are not the same, when viewed within the context of the moral framework you articulate, the two words are largely indistinguishable. Moreover, should you seek to argue semantics, then you undermine the perception of your moral standing and legitimacy. For obvious reasons, if you state an absolute moral principle and then try to beg out and argue semantics for why you shouldn't be held to the standard you've articulated, at minimum it looks flaky (even if your argument is valid).
Further, you do great harm to the pro life movement and its outreach by articulating and validating a position of indifference (it's not my problem) and offering permission to "look the other way." This encourages tribalism, division, and alienation when the goal of any movement seeking to gain traction is to be as inclusive as possible to as wide a demographic as possible. If the principles behind the pro life movement are meant to exist above the partisan divide then they must be applicable in other scenarios not simply abortion. When you reject and dismiss such applications in a partisan way or complain about being held to 'weird standards' you undermine the legitimacy of the "principle" you claim to follow. When people accuse you of being inconsistent its because they are holding you to their understanding of your principle. That's a good thing because they've already assumed your moral principle is valid! Perhaps their understanding is incorrect or wrong, but if you shut them down without addressing this, you sow the seeds of distrust and hypocrisy. As you state, if the public perception is that your moral compass is broken, they aren't likely to take your moral pronouncements seriously.
Lastly, from what I've seen, you do not devalue other people's tragedies in order to elevate pro life issues, nor do you appropriate issues of other groups to legitimize pro life arguments (so kudos to you). Unfortunately this is not the case for the larger movement. Since the comments you mentioned did not appear to be directly accusing ERI of inconsistency, your defense against inconsistency is not valid within this wider context.
Proverbs 24:10-12 (NLTSE)
[10] If you fail under pressure,
your strength is too small.
[11] Rescue those who are unjustly sentenced to die;
save them as they stagger to their death.
[12] Don't excuse yourself by saying, "Look, we didn't know."
For God understands all hearts, and he sees you.
He who guards your soul knows you knew.
He will repay all people as their actions deserve.
I have heard Christians say that this justifies defense. It certainly compells us to defend anyone facing death. Especially in the light of James 4:17 (NLTSE)
[17] Remember, it is sin to know what you ought to do and then not do it.
I have problems understanding how it is OK to use violence to carry out that defense in some situations but not in others.
I don’t believe in any violence against humans. I believe that’s for God to sort out.
But I think it is inconsistent to say that it is ok to use violence to save a born person from injury or death but not to save an unborn person from death. If it is about numbers of deaths, an abortionist kills thousands of people. After all, 50 to 80 million people were killed over the 6 years in WW2. In 2016, the total deaths in the world from all causes eg war, famine, disease, cancer, old age etc was 56.9Million:
http://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/the-top-10-causes-of-death
The number of people executed in the prenatal stages of life per year is nearly the same- 56 Million (2010–2014),
(https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-worldwide).
Perhaps there is something I’m missing here.
(I do admit it may be inconsistent to be a pacifist and also go to doctors)
Considering that the number of same gender “couples” is less than 2% of all couples (according to several censuses), the numbers of babies killed for this reason would, I expect, be low although I do agree that 1 death is too many.
But I think it's not surprising that many intelligent pro-choicers might think they find inconsistency in a pro-life position that does not also promote various liberal positions such as those you mention – even if you tell them that you base your pro-life position on "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" or "it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings." I think the problem revolves around this:
I’m justifying my pro-life stance. . . . with the principle that it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings. Perhaps I should be using a different principle.
I think that a different principle would in fact seem less inconsistent to many people, because "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" and "it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings" may seem to many people like narrow principles you could not genuinely hold without basing them on some more foundational principle.
To a utilitarian, for instance, you would have to base "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" on the idea that we ought not kill a small, defenseless person BECAUSE it would deprive that small, defenseless person of happiness. And then the utilitarian would argue that if the small, defenseless person was likely to grow up poor, killing it would NOT deprive it of happiness – rather it would only deprive it of unhappiness – and would argue moreover that anyone concerned about happiness would have to be concerned about the happiness or unhappiness of immigrant children, for instance.
Maybe there is also a different set of pro-choicers, who would in fact agree that you are not being inconsistent if your principle is "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people," but how often do they hear pro-lifers clearly articulating that narrow principle? Pro-choicers see pro-lifers holding up pictures of cute babies and saying "life!" (if not simply invoking God), and naturally those pro-choicers think of cute immigrant kids whose quality-of-life, if not life itself, is at risk just as that of the unborn is. Many pro-choicers may not actually hear pro-lifers clearly articulating ANY narrow moral principle, so naturally they make assumptions about what pro-lifers' main moral principle must be – generalized compassion, for instance – and they observe that many pro-lifers don't seem to be applying that (assumed) principle consistently.
And a couple of factors make it still harder for pro-choicers to see a consistent application of that assumed principle of generalized compassion:
Regarding 2: Let's suppose the right actually cares as much as the left about immigrant children separated from their parents, or cares even more, but thinks that the solution, rather than releasing both parents and children into the US, is better supply-side economics in Guatemala.
If they think that that is the solution, why didn't they get some heart-rending images of immigrant children and organize a supply-side-economics demonstration in front of the Guatemalan Embassy even BEFORE the left organized any demonstrations? Why did they let it appear that, had the left not taken the initiative regarding those separated kids, they (the right) would have remained perfectly happy with the status quo and oblivious to all the suffering?
And then another thing is: luxury.
If supply-side or other right-wing economics is correct, that still wouldn't explain Mitt Romney saying, "Ann drives a couple of Cadillacs." That still wouldn't explain luxury spending and other seemingly unnecessary kinds of spending by conservatives – all the seemingly bloated military spending, for instance.
To summarize: I agree that pro-lifers are not actually inconsistent, but I think it may be more understandable than you may have indicated why pro-choicers might perceive them that way.
By the way, getting back to this –
The question of how much we help other people, or rather, the question of how much we force people to help other people, is different in kind from the question of whether we allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people
– and what you have called elsewhere "the intentional killing vs withholding treatment distinction," coincidentally I just read yesterday something that might be worth thinking about. Paul Bloom, in Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, says:
We think it is worse to intentionally kill someone than to knowingly allow the person to die (even when rescuing them would be relatively easy), because no society can survive if individuals could kill one another at will, but it's less critical that we be obliged to save one another.
In other words, a moral intuition developed in us evolutionarily that we should not kill, but there was no such evolutionary compulsion to develop an intuition to rescue – which would mean that the differing intuitions might mislead us into thinking that there is a moral distinction which a deeper philosophy or deeper meditation would not support.
The second part about “evolutionary compulsion” seems to fit with what Fr Robert J Spitzer calls the “silver rule”: don’t do to anyone else what you don’t want them to do to you. Some people think this is the golden rule but that is: Luke 6:31 (NLTSE)
[31] Do to others as you would like them to do to you.
which is quite different.
I like your concept of using a) b) c) and d)
So if a) is pro abortion choice
And someone who is in favour of a) and b) and c) and d) says that to oppose a) you must agree with b) c) and d) is being inconsistent because if that were the case either: they would need to oppose a) or they would need to say that being in favour of b) c) and d) requires agreement with a) to be consistent.
As you point out, this things have no connection and so the accusations are null and void.
"And someone who is in favour of a) and b) and c) and d) [and] says that to oppose a) you must agree with b) c) and d) is being inconsistent because if that were the case either: they would need to oppose a) or they would need to say that being in favour of b) c) and d) requires agreement with a) to be consistent."
So you argue that a pro-choicer who alleges inconsistency on our side claims (A) –
that to oppose a) you must agree with [/support] b) c) and d)
– which if true would falsify/negate a claim (B) –
to support b) c) and d) you must agree with [/support] a)*
– and yet those pro-choicers DO support a) b) c) and d), a position which you think must be based on claim B. So you think they are making claim B, which would be inconsistent in light of their claim A.
I agree that A falsifies B.
But are those pro-choicers really necessarily making claim B?
They could support a) b) c) and d) based on another claim (C) –
to support b) c) and d) you need not, but CAN, support a).
In other words, those pro-choicers may be arguing –
to oppose a) you must support b) c) and d), but you can support b) c) and d) and also support a).
How would that work? Well, couldn't they consistently argue (I won't necessarily say correctly argue, but consistently argue), for instance –
to oppose a) you must believe that the unborn are persons, and if you defend the unborn on grounds of compassion as we think you do, you must defend liberal policy interpretations of compassion toward other groups of persons – if you don't you are inconsistent by your own premises – whereas we can support a) and also support liberal policy interpretations of compassion toward other groups, because we don't think the unborn are persons – we have different premises from you, and you are inconsistent by your own premises, while we are not inconsistent by our own premises.
(See also what Timothy Brahm says above about the two libertarians.)
But I think it's not surprising that many intelligent pro-choicers might think they find inconsistency in a pro-life position that does not also promote various liberal positions such as those you mention – even if you tell them that you base your pro-life position on "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" or "it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings." I think the problem revolves around this:
I’m justifying my pro-life stance. . . . with the principle that it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings. Perhaps I should be using a different principle.
I think that a different principle would in fact seem less inconsistent to many people, because "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" and "it’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings" may seem to many people like narrow principles you could not genuinely hold without basing them on some more foundational principle.
To a utilitarian, for instance, you would have to base "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people" on the idea that we ought not kill a small, defenseless person BECAUSE it would deprive that small, defenseless person of happiness. And then the utilitarian would argue that if the small, defenseless person was likely to grow up poor, killing it would NOT deprive it of happiness – rather it would only deprive it of unhappiness – and would argue moreover that anyone concerned about happiness would have to be concerned about the happiness or unhappiness of immigrant children, for instance.
Maybe there are also a different set of pro-choicers, who would in fact agree that you are not being inconsistent if your principle is "we [ought not] allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people," but how often do they hear pro-lifers clearly articulating that narrow principle? Pro-choicers see pro-lifers holding up pictures of cute babies and saying "life!" (if not simply invoking God), and naturally those pro-choicers think of cute immigrant kids whose quality-of-life, if not life itself, is at risk just as that of the unborn is. Many pro-choicers may not actually hear pro-lifers clearly articulating ANY narrow moral principle, so naturally they make assumptions about what pro-lifers' main moral principle must be -- generalized compassion, for instance -- and they observe that many pro-lifers don't seem to be applying that (assumed) principle consistently.
And a couple of factors make it still harder for pro-choicers to see a consistent application of that assumed principle of generalized compassion:
Regarding 2: Let's suppose the right actually cares as much as the left about immigrant children separated from their parents, or cares even more, but thinks that the solution, rather than releasing both parents and children into the US, is better supply-side economics in Guatemala.
If they think that that is the solution, why didn't they organize a supply-side-economics demonstration in front of the Guatemalan Embassy even BEFORE the left organized any demonstrations? Why did they let it appear that, had the left not taken the initiative regarding those separated kids, they (the right) would have remained perfectly happy with the status quo and oblivious to all the suffering?
And then another thing is: luxury.
If supply-side or other right-wing economics is correct, that still wouldn't explain Mitt Romney saying, "Ann drives a couple of Cadillacs." That still wouldn't explain luxury spending and other seemingly unnecessary kinds of spending by conservatives – all the seemingly bloated military spending, for instance.
By the way, getting back to this –
The question of how much we help other people, or rather, the question of how much we force people to help other people, is different in kind from the question of whether we allow small, defenseless people to be killed by comparatively large, powerful people
– and what you have called elsewhere "the intentional killing vs withholding treatment distinction," coincidentally I just read yesterday something that might be worth thinking about. Paul Bloom, in Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, says:
We think it is worse to intentionally kill someone than to knowingly allow the person to die (even when rescuing them would be relatively easy), because no society can survive if individuals could kill one another at will, but it's less critical that we be obliged to save one another.
In other words, a moral intuition developed in us evolutionarily that we should not kill, but there was no such evolutionary compulsion to develop an intuition to rescue – which would mean that the differing intuitions might mislead us into thinking that there is a moral distinction which a deeper philosophy or deeper meditation would not support.