I very much appreciate honesty about one's degree of ignorance, whatever that degree may be. But I have started wondering about some of the operative part of this essay -- "[Because I am somewhat ignorant,] I should keep my opinion to myself." Silence is not completely neutral in its effects, it benefits the status quo. If one thinks that the killing was an act of police brutality, but due to uncertainty refrains from saying so, surely that silence will be welcomed by the side one opposes, however uncertainly one opposes it. Suppose everyone who hadn't completely done their homework had stayed home from MLK's March on Washington. [Edit: (Not highly analogous in terms of difficulty of determining that injustice has occurred, but I'm not sure how general a principle is being proposed here.)] Still thinking about this . . . but there is some truth also in "If the fool would persist in his folly, he would become wise." [Edit: "If you haven’t carefully read and considered the reasoning of those who disagree with you, then you have no business making strong, confident statements on the subject." Making qualified statements might be a good middle ground. If one suspects police brutality, one might join a Michael Brown march carrying a sign "I want further investigation."]
I was actually conscious of this concern when I wrote my status. In the first part, I made a statement about what I felt was wise for me in this situation. Given my level of understanding, I think I'm better off not making a public comment in this case (though I have made some comments in private conversations). I don't think it's always foolish to make public comments of any kind if you haven't carefully read and considered counter-arguments, but such comments should have the modesty that is appropriate to non-researched opinions. Qualified statements are fine, as long as you don't have an unjustly inflated view of your own statements. A friend of mine once said "you stop being open-minded about your opinion once you publish it," and I think there's some truth to that. It's easy to make a qualified statement publicly, and then feel like you need to defend turf, and then become less open-minded.
Thanks. That seems like a perfect statement, and maybe I was just being too picky about your earlier formulation. And in what I wrote, one thing I hadn't thought through was the time value of certain activist participations. For example (using my weak knowledge of history) the storming of the Bastille. Probably a lot of mob psychology was involved. And yet they did what history has judged (I think) to be a good thing. If half of the people involved had hesitated for just an hour because they hadn't done their homework carefully, all might have been lost. "the modesty that is appropriate. . . . feel like you need to defend turf, and then become less open-minded." If I may change subjects to the topic of modesty and open-mindedness itself: I have thought a lot about the pre-logical origins of the moral principles that we unavoidably operate on, and it seems to me that such thinking, if people will try it, is another path, really a wide highway, towards humility and consequent open-mindedness in moral debates. If you have time, I would appreciate your looking on this page -- http://www.NoTerminationWithoutRepresentation.org/moral-intuition-logic-and-the-abortion-debate/ -- at the four numbered points near the end (and the paragraph that precedes it). I would very much like your opinion.
I'm not a good enough student of history to make much of a comment on the storming of the Bastille. Assuming for a minute that it is as you stated, that it was motivated by mob psychology and poor justification but in retrospect deemed a good thing, I don't think a good result that came from poor thinking justifies poor thinking. I could shoot a gun randomly in a dark room and happen to shoot a would-be murderer, and we could all be very glad that I did what I did, but that wouldn't make it a smart idea to randomly shoot guns. Having said that, urgency certainly impacts how much justification we need in order to act. Suppose we happened to know that a hostage-taker intended to kill himself and his hostage in one hour, plenty of time for SWAT to arrive on the scene. Let's say I have a gun handy and could take a shot at the bad guy. I happen to be a very bad shot, so it'd be better to wait for SWAT. But if he's going to kill the hostage in 30 seconds and I'm the only possible person that can stop it, I should take the shot and do my best to save the hostage. Without having read the whole piece, I'm not sure what the author is trying to argue in the points at the end. I certainly agree that we tend to believe what we want to believe, and that intuitions are not 100% reliable, but then again some intuitions should be trusted. I think many disagreements about abortion ultimately come down to a central point of disagreement, but to reduce that to just a matter of one intuition vs another seems dangerous. Yes, we have different intuitions, but some of us have better intuitions, or better reasoning about our intuitions. The way he wrote it, it sounds a bit like once you identify a core disagreement about an intuition, you can't go much further, and I disagree with that pretty strongly. Again, I'm not sure if he's meaning to imply that. The author also seems to imply that where we get our intuitions from is far more out of our control than I think they are. I'm getting uncomfortable deterministic-type feelings about his second bullet point. However, I certainly agree both sides could benefit from more humility. I don't think I agree with the third point, but I'd have to discuss it with the author, we probably have a lot of common ground. I have seen many people change their minds about abortion in the course of a logical discussion and the author seems a lot more pessimistic about how far we can get with logic than I am. I think his fourth point is generally good. People are generally better off if they're aware of their feelings and how their feelings influence their opinions.
In the blog post I had linked to -- http://www.NoTerminationWithoutRepresentation.org/moral-intuition-logic-and-the-abortion-debate/ -- I have now added this paragraph: In http://www.jfaweb.org/Training/DeFactoGuardian-v03.pdf Steve Wagner, Timothy Brahm, et. al. find their pre-logical moral intuitions that Mary should be legally obligated to feed the child; then they proceed, in a section called “Making Sense of Our Intuitions,” to cogitate logically about the morally-relevant factors and to develop some taxonomy, “de facto guardian.” While I agree with them on most details and am grateful for what they have done, I would like to explore the rationale for this section: If there were no plausible logical way to “make sense of their intuitions,” would that mean that the intuitions were wrong? If there were a way, but no logical power on earth could find that way, would that mean that the intuitions were wrong? If there were a way, but these particular individuals could not find the way, should they moderate the degree of their conviction about the matter? And is there ever really any need for intuition – could these authors, for instance, have come to the same moral principles through logic alone? I would appreciate any feedback you might have time to give.
Thanks again. I am the author of the piece, sorry that that wasn't clear. I would ideally like to follow up on a lot of your feedback, but not knowing how far you might be able to stay engaged with this, let me just focus on this: "I don't think I agree with the third point, but I'd have to discuss it with the author, we probably have a lot of common ground. I have seen many people change their minds about abortion in the course of a logical discussion and the author seems a lot more pessimistic about how far we can get with logic than I am." We do have common ground insofar as agreeing that people can change their minds about a moral issue in the course of a logical discussion. But when that occurs, we may differ in how we analyze exactly what has occurred. I have just been debating this question of "what has occurred" with another Timothy (who happens to be a pro-choicer, but the present debate is about logic and moral intuition in more universal terms). I wrote to him: "Think of the argument that clinched your position on any moral issue. (On the abortion issue, perhaps it was Thomson's argument.) Did that argument really provide you a mathematical proof -- and if so why doesn't it work for every intelligent person -- or did it just nudge you in the direction of your present intuition -- whose provenance in your unconscious you don't really know -- whereafter you began to say to yourself and to others, 'I find this argument completely convincing' -- ? We should credit an argument like that for nudging us, but not for being completely convincing, because our moral intuitions come out of a realm that we don't really understand." And in my piece, the paragraph that followed those 4 points was: "In the build-up to the abolition of slavery in the US, many people intuited that slavery was wrong; but the fact that slavery was ultimately abolished doesn’t mean that it was ever proved logically to be wrong. The abolitionist intuition was not proven; it prevailed. There is now a consensus, which I agree with, that slavery is wrong — that what prevailed, in other words, was the correct intuition — but even today, if someone were to advance a logical argument saying that slavery is right, that argument could not be conclusively defeated on its own terms. What our moral intuitions regarding slavery have undergone has been a process of evolution, and our moral intuitions regarding abortion will undergo the same. The question of the morality of slavery is ultimately intractable to a logical approach, and so are questions of the morality of abortion and of abortion law." You have written: "intuitions are not 100% reliable, but then again some intuitions should be trusted. . . . we have different intuitions, but some of us have better intuitions," I would say that there must be intuitions that are 100% reliable, but what is not reliable is a way to identify the reliable ones to the satisfaction of everyone, or even in most cases to the complete satisfaction of the person who holds the intuition. I think that a few people, perhaps including the Buddha and Jesus, may have held moral intuitions that were 100% reliable and may also have been completely satisfied that those intuitions were correct. But even they would have been unable to prove the correctness of their intuitions to a logician. Their intuitions (expressed as moral teachings) were accepted by people who trusted those persons in their hearts. Can you give an example, historical or hypothetical, of an intuition that should be trusted, or an intuition of one person that you know to be better than that of another person, and explain why you say that? "The author also seems to imply that where we get our intuitions from is far more out of our control than I think they are. I'm getting uncomfortable deterministic-type feelings about his second bullet point." I definitely admit to being a determinist. I see my actions and their consequences for the unfoldment of the world's future, and my motivations to act and my SENSE of free will while acting, as all part of what has been predetermined, so my deterministic beliefs don't result in my acting differently than if I believed in free will. But getting specifically to your point: If I can alter an intuition of mine through conscious control, should I still call it an intuition, and anyway wouldn't my desire to alter it stem from some other intuition that came out of my unconscious in some way I cannot understand? I had also written earlier in the piece: "Logic can be applied to intuitions, but as a dispassionate science, it can only demonstrate the correctness of any moral intuition, if at all, with reference to some already-existing moral intuition. Tracing back in this way, we will eventually come to some moral intuition that was not arrived at through logic. It came out of our unconscious in some way we cannot understand." [Edit: P.S. -- As I think of "mob psychology," it doesn't mean that the reasons necessarily either carry or lack good justification. And as I (with my impressionistic historical knowledge) think of the Bastille event, there was good justification, but many people accepted that there was simply because many others said that there was and seemed worked up about it. The reasons of the leaders weren't like those of shooting a gun randomly in a dark room. But had they been dumb reasons like those and had the leaders represented those reasons as good and intelligent, many people would have followed them, because those people weren't doing their homework.]
[Edit: "If you haven’t carefully read and considered the reasoning of those who disagree with you, then you have no business making strong, confident statements on the subject." Making qualified statements might be a good middle ground. If one suspects police brutality, one might join a Michael Brown march carrying a sign "I want further investigation."]
And in what I wrote, one thing I hadn't thought through was the time value of certain activist participations. For example (using my weak knowledge of history) the storming of the Bastille. Probably a lot of mob psychology was involved. And yet they did what history has judged (I think) to be a good thing. If half of the people involved had hesitated for just an hour because they hadn't done their homework carefully, all might have been lost.
"the modesty that is appropriate. . . . feel like you need to defend turf, and then become less open-minded."
If I may change subjects to the topic of modesty and open-mindedness itself: I have thought a lot about the pre-logical origins of the moral principles that we unavoidably operate on, and it seems to me that such thinking, if people will try it, is another path, really a wide highway, towards humility and consequent open-mindedness in moral debates. If you have time, I would appreciate your looking on this page --
http://www.NoTerminationWithoutRepresentation.org/moral-intuition-logic-and-the-abortion-debate/
-- at the four numbered points near the end (and the paragraph that precedes it). I would very much like your opinion.
Having said that, urgency certainly impacts how much justification we need in order to act. Suppose we happened to know that a hostage-taker intended to kill himself and his hostage in one hour, plenty of time for SWAT to arrive on the scene. Let's say I have a gun handy and could take a shot at the bad guy. I happen to be a very bad shot, so it'd be better to wait for SWAT. But if he's going to kill the hostage in 30 seconds and I'm the only possible person that can stop it, I should take the shot and do my best to save the hostage.
Without having read the whole piece, I'm not sure what the author is trying to argue in the points at the end. I certainly agree that we tend to believe what we want to believe, and that intuitions are not 100% reliable, but then again some intuitions should be trusted.
I think many disagreements about abortion ultimately come down to a central point of disagreement, but to reduce that to just a matter of one intuition vs another seems dangerous. Yes, we have different intuitions, but some of us have better intuitions, or better reasoning about our intuitions. The way he wrote it, it sounds a bit like once you identify a core disagreement about an intuition, you can't go much further, and I disagree with that pretty strongly. Again, I'm not sure if he's meaning to imply that. The author also seems to imply that where we get our intuitions from is far more out of our control than I think they are. I'm getting uncomfortable deterministic-type feelings about his second bullet point. However, I certainly agree both sides could benefit from more humility.
I don't think I agree with the third point, but I'd have to discuss it with the author, we probably have a lot of common ground. I have seen many people change their minds about abortion in the course of a logical discussion and the author seems a lot more pessimistic about how far we can get with logic than I am.
I think his fourth point is generally good. People are generally better off if they're aware of their feelings and how their feelings influence their opinions.
http://www.NoTerminationWithoutRepresentation.org/moral-intuition-logic-and-the-abortion-debate/
-- I have now added this paragraph:
In http://www.jfaweb.org/Training/DeFactoGuardian-v03.pdf Steve Wagner, Timothy Brahm, et. al. find their pre-logical moral intuitions that Mary should be legally obligated to feed the child; then they proceed, in a section called “Making Sense of Our Intuitions,” to cogitate logically about the morally-relevant factors and to develop some taxonomy, “de facto guardian.” While I agree with them on most details and am grateful for what they have done, I would like to explore the rationale for this section: If there were no plausible logical way to “make sense of their intuitions,” would that mean that the intuitions were wrong? If there were a way, but no logical power on earth could find that way, would that mean that the intuitions were wrong? If there were a way, but these particular individuals could not find the way, should they moderate the degree of their conviction about the matter? And is there ever really any need for intuition – could these authors, for instance, have come to the same moral principles through logic alone?
I would appreciate any feedback you might have time to give.
I am the author of the piece, sorry that that wasn't clear.
I would ideally like to follow up on a lot of your feedback, but not knowing how far you might be able to stay engaged with this, let me just focus on this:
"I don't think I agree with the third point, but I'd have to discuss it with the author, we probably have a lot of common ground. I have seen many people change their minds about abortion in the course of a logical discussion and the author seems a lot more pessimistic about how far we can get with logic than I am."
We do have common ground insofar as agreeing that people can change their minds about a moral issue in the course of a logical discussion. But when that occurs, we may differ in how we analyze exactly what has occurred. I have just been debating this question of "what has occurred" with another Timothy (who happens to be a pro-choicer, but the present debate is about logic and moral intuition in more universal terms). I wrote to him:
"Think of the argument that clinched your position on any moral issue. (On the abortion issue, perhaps it was Thomson's argument.) Did that argument really provide you a mathematical proof -- and if so why doesn't it work for every intelligent person -- or did it just nudge you in the direction of your present intuition -- whose provenance in your unconscious you don't really know -- whereafter you began to say to yourself and to others, 'I find this argument completely convincing' -- ? We should credit an argument like that for nudging us, but not for being completely convincing, because our moral intuitions come out of a realm that we don't really understand."
And in my piece, the paragraph that followed those 4 points was:
"In the build-up to the abolition of slavery in the US, many people intuited that slavery was wrong; but the fact that slavery was ultimately abolished doesn’t mean that it was ever proved logically to be wrong. The abolitionist intuition was not proven; it prevailed. There is now a consensus, which I agree with, that slavery is wrong — that what prevailed, in other words, was the correct intuition — but even today, if someone were to advance a logical argument saying that slavery is right, that argument could not be conclusively defeated on its own terms. What our moral intuitions regarding slavery have undergone has been a process of evolution, and our moral intuitions regarding abortion will undergo the same. The question of the morality of slavery is ultimately intractable to a logical approach, and so are questions of the morality of abortion and of abortion law."
You have written: "intuitions are not 100% reliable, but then again some intuitions should be trusted. . . . we have different intuitions, but some of us have better intuitions,"
I would say that there must be intuitions that are 100% reliable, but what is not reliable is a way to identify the reliable ones to the satisfaction of everyone, or even in most cases to the complete satisfaction of the person who holds the intuition. I think that a few people, perhaps including the Buddha and Jesus, may have held moral intuitions that were 100% reliable and may also have been completely satisfied that those intuitions were correct. But even they would have been unable to prove the correctness of their intuitions to a logician. Their intuitions (expressed as moral teachings) were accepted by people who trusted those persons in their hearts.
Can you give an example, historical or hypothetical, of an intuition that should be trusted, or an intuition of one person that you know to be better than that of another person, and explain why you say that?
"The author also seems to imply that where we get our intuitions from is far more out of our control than I think they are. I'm getting uncomfortable deterministic-type feelings about his second bullet point."
I definitely admit to being a determinist. I see my actions and their consequences for the unfoldment of the world's future, and my motivations to act and my SENSE of free will while acting, as all part of what has been predetermined, so my deterministic beliefs don't result in my acting differently than if I believed in free will. But getting specifically to your point: If I can alter an intuition of mine through conscious control, should I still call it an intuition, and anyway wouldn't my desire to alter it stem from some other intuition that came out of my unconscious in some way I cannot understand?
I had also written earlier in the piece: "Logic can be applied to intuitions, but as a dispassionate science, it can only demonstrate the correctness of any moral intuition, if at all, with reference to some already-existing moral intuition. Tracing back in this way, we will eventually come to some moral intuition that was not arrived at through logic. It came out of our unconscious in some way we cannot understand."
[Edit: P.S. -- As I think of "mob psychology," it doesn't mean that the reasons necessarily either carry or lack good justification. And as I (with my impressionistic historical knowledge) think of the Bastille event, there was good justification, but many people accepted that there was simply because many others said that there was and seemed worked up about it. The reasons of the leaders weren't like those of shooting a gun randomly in a dark room. But had they been dumb reasons like those and had the leaders represented those reasons as good and intelligent, many people would have followed them, because those people weren't doing their homework.]
http://www.lifenews.com/2014/11/26/since-michael-brown-died-981-black-babies-have-died-in-abortion-in-missouri-but-there-are-no-riots/