I'm afraid this argument, such as it is, fails completely, turning as it does on slippery use of language.
Nobody - nobody sane - is saying that the foetus will not become part of the species of homo sapiens, in the same way that the acorn is a species of oak. But to insist on this linguistic distinction misses the point of the analogy.
"a living member of the species Homo sapiens exists. Of course it’s not an adult, but it is a human, and I think that all living humans deserve an equal right to be protected from violence" - if we think about this sentence even for a moment we can see how riddled with non-sequitur and vagueness this us. What is meant by living? What is meant by human? Later on, you conflate 'human' with 'person' - what is meant by person? Still later, 'biologically human' - is this different from human? The same?
The oak seed is 'organised' (in your language) and capable of growing into an oak tree without external help (in this way it is actually different from a foetus). But an oak acorn is not an oak tree. Not in the same way that a child is not an adult - in the same way as a foetus is not a child. The whole point of the analogy is this: the qualities which mean we ascribe rights to certain persons (e.g. things like sentience, capacity to feel pain, etc) are NOT present in the foetus, in the same way that the qualities which we ascribe to an oak tree (tallness, branches, etc) are NOT present in the acorn. In other words, and in direct opposition to your point, the traits that make a foetus different from a child ARE morally relevant.
Can I also say that the comments section rightfully warns against snarkiness or a lack of charity, but that the tone and thrust of this post ("DUH!", etc) would appear to fall victim to that same charge.
You make some good points here. I don't think that there is any debate that a fetus is alive. It is composed of cell. Cells are alive. I think the issue here is whether or not the fetus is a PERSON. Relevant discussion needs to center on what it means to be a person. I don't think we really know what it means or when personhood begins. It is because of that unknowingness that I oppose abortion. Since we do not know when personshood begins, we should err on the side of caution. We should assume that a fetus is a person unless and until we have reason to believe otherwise.
The concept of 'living' is actually very well defined by biologists: cellular organization, growth & development, energy use, homeostasis, response to their environment, the ability to reproduce, and the ability to adapt, are among it essential elements. In fact, nowhere in an individual organism's lifespan are the first of these traits occurring more vigorously than in the fetal stage. The last three of these traits are either not measurable in the microscopic environment of the fetus or are not relevant. (The final trait, reproduction, is not relevant in humans for the early decades of life). Unlike the acorn, the fetus is conceived in the proper environment and is self-actualizing from the instant of sperm fusion with the ovum. Its true that a fetus demands a specific environment it to maintain itself, but so does an acorn. If an acorn lands in my swimming pool or upon a rock, it dies and decays. Every one-celled organism can react to noxious stimuli, from amoebas on up. Long before a woman has an inkling that she is pregnant, individual cells of a fetus are rapidly differentiating into three general cell lines (ectoderm, mesoderm and endoderm) and these cells are rapidly moving into specific positions within the fetus to form tissue and proto-organs. While the organizational structure of a fetus prevents individual cells from moving directly in response to noxious stimuli, the fetus is developing so rapidly as to quickly gift these organs and tissues with the capacity of mounting a coordinated response to any intrusion into their environment.
You statement that the fetus is not able to feel pain is simply false even in very early stages of fetal development. There are many online refutations of the sentient argument that you propose as being relevant, for instance, during sleep or drug-induced coma, and it is simply not a criteria for person-hood. The pertinent point is that if it is not intentionally killed, the overwhelming probability is that a zygote, embryo, fetus would live for an additional 70 years or more. Sadly, it seems that only the first 9 months of these years are what is problematic for most pro-choice people and this is what makes abortion a moral abomination.
My point was not that the original oak acorn analogy necessarily had merit, it was that the author had inadvertently misrepresented it in the argument, leading to a straw man. The precise similarities or differences between development etc of the acorn Vs the foetus are irrelevant to the analogy - what exactly the cells are or aren't doing is also I irrelevant, all that matters is that there is a qualitative difference.
With that said, and just flagged for the sake of brevity since these are all rather larger claims (1) definitive claims about pain in the foetus are up for debate but most of the evidence points to the possibility of pain only in the third trimester. You obviously can't really make completely definitive claims (I'm guilty here too) since you can't ask the foetus. (2) there is a clear and obvious distinction between a temporary loss of sentience and never having had it in the first place - we can argue about it, but it is grossly close minded to dismiss it as "simply not a criteria" (3) no-one is denying that abortion causes the foetus the probable 'loss' of a valuable future in the strictly non-moral, neutral sense of the word 'loss' (although perhaps you can't really lose what you've never had). The question is whether it is a moral loss. If you beat me in a race with £100 at stake, you have caused me a loss but no-one would argue you are morally culpable for my loss - whereas, if you won by stealing my shoes, you would be. If the foetus has a moral right to its future, then abortion is probably wrong. If the loss is neutral, then it isn't. Of course, in order to answer whether or not the foetus has a moral right to its future you need to establish a right to unrestricted use of the mother's body which puts you right back into arguments about rights. So "the pertinent point" is anything but, and sweeping statements do not make it otherwise.
I feel like the attempt to show disanalogous the cake batter analogy proved weaker than I'm sure it was expected. The zygote grows itself into a larger and more complex human being, but the embryo, and even the fetus for a significant duration of time cannot grow itself without the help of the mother. Just like the cake requires another to mix it, the human embryo and fetus requires the mother to nourish it. How does one maintain the embryo or fetus is self-directed when it cannot maintain, for example, the homeostasis between carbon dioxide and oxygen without the respiration of the mother? I am finding it difficult to contend with the idea that the embryo maintains homeostasis when portions of its homeostasis are dependent upon the mother.
The infant and child require the mother or another human being to maintain homeostasis after birth. And they will continue to depend on other organisms for food and a suitable environment throughout the entire lifespan. But they are still living human organisms, as is the unborn child, because their own development is organised from within. The key word is “organise“, not dependency.
Nobody - nobody sane - is saying that the foetus will not become part of the species of homo sapiens, in the same way that the acorn is a species of oak. But to insist on this linguistic distinction misses the point of the analogy.
"a living member of the species Homo sapiens exists. Of course it’s not an adult, but it is a human, and I think that all living humans deserve an equal right to be protected from violence" - if we think about this sentence even for a moment we can see how riddled with non-sequitur and vagueness this us. What is meant by living? What is meant by human? Later on, you conflate 'human' with 'person' - what is meant by person? Still later, 'biologically human' - is this different from human? The same?
The oak seed is 'organised' (in your language) and capable of growing into an oak tree without external help (in this way it is actually different from a foetus). But an oak acorn is not an oak tree. Not in the same way that a child is not an adult - in the same way as a foetus is not a child. The whole point of the analogy is this: the qualities which mean we ascribe rights to certain persons (e.g. things like sentience, capacity to feel pain, etc) are NOT present in the foetus, in the same way that the qualities which we ascribe to an oak tree (tallness, branches, etc) are NOT present in the acorn. In other words, and in direct opposition to your point, the traits that make a foetus different from a child ARE morally relevant.
Can I also say that the comments section rightfully warns against snarkiness or a lack of charity, but that the tone and thrust of this post ("DUH!", etc) would appear to fall victim to that same charge.
You statement that the fetus is not able to feel pain is simply false even in very early stages of fetal development. There are many online refutations of the sentient argument that you propose as being relevant, for instance, during sleep or drug-induced coma, and it is simply not a criteria for person-hood. The pertinent point is that if it is not intentionally killed, the overwhelming probability is that a zygote, embryo, fetus would live for an additional 70 years or more. Sadly, it seems that only the first 9 months of these years are what is problematic for most pro-choice people and this is what makes abortion a moral abomination.
With that said, and just flagged for the sake of brevity since these are all rather larger claims
(1) definitive claims about pain in the foetus are up for debate but most of the evidence points to the possibility of pain only in the third trimester. You obviously can't really make completely definitive claims (I'm guilty here too) since you can't ask the foetus.
(2) there is a clear and obvious distinction between a temporary loss of sentience and never having had it in the first place - we can argue about it, but it is grossly close minded to dismiss it as "simply not a criteria"
(3) no-one is denying that abortion causes the foetus the probable 'loss' of a valuable future in the strictly non-moral, neutral sense of the word 'loss' (although perhaps you can't really lose what you've never had). The question is whether it is a moral loss. If you beat me in a race with £100 at stake, you have caused me a loss but no-one would argue you are morally culpable for my loss - whereas, if you won by stealing my shoes, you would be. If the foetus has a moral right to its future, then abortion is probably wrong. If the loss is neutral, then it isn't. Of course, in order to answer whether or not the foetus has a moral right to its future you need to establish a right to unrestricted use of the mother's body which puts you right back into arguments about rights. So "the pertinent point" is anything but, and sweeping statements do not make it otherwise.